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URBAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: EMERGENT
CITIZENS' RIGHTS FOR THE AESTHETIC, THE
SPIRITUAL, AND THE SPACIOUSt
Nicholas A. Robinson*
I. Introduction
The issues in environmental law which have been championed in
recent years by conservationists, ecologists, lawyers, and legislators
have been largely directed toward the natural environment. How-
ever, very recently and with growing force, new law has been chan-
neled into the service of our nation's urban centers as well as its
wilderness. The need to redress urban ills has been widely appre-
ciated, but the gap between intellectual awareness and responsive
action has remained substantial.
The now traditional responses to urban problems have involved
the creation of zoning laws,' public housing programs,2 and urban
renewal.' While these laws have given rise to a host of litigations
involving property rights4 and personal liberties,' little attention
had been given to the vindication of individual citizen rights to a
healthy urban environment. The emphasis has been on broad
schemes to redress urban ills, not on self-enforceable rights.'
t Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (Douglas, J.).
* A.B. Brown University; J.D. Columbia University School of Law. Mr. Robinson is a
member of the New York Bar, and is associated with Marshall, Bratter, Greene, Allison &
Tucker, New York, New York.
1. The constitutional validity of reasonable local zoning regulations was upheld in Village
of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). The reasonableness of a regulation varies
with individual "circumstances and conditions." Id. at 387.
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401-35 (1970).
3. The National Housing Act of 1949 provided for slum clearance projects, in which slum
areas were cleared and then redeveloped for new uses. In 1953, a Presidential Advisory
Committee on housing policies recommended the extension of the slum clearance program
to include neighborhood conservation and rehabilitation. PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COMM. ON
GOV'T HOUSING POLICIES & PROGRAMS, A REPORT To THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
115 (1953). The term "urban renewal" was coined for the new program, and the 1954 federal
statute reflects these changes. For the definition of "urban renewal project," see 42 U.S.C. §
1460(c) (1970). See generally, Mandelker, The Comprehensive Planning Requirement In
Urban Renewal, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 25 (1967).
4. See R. ANDERSON, THE AMERICAN LAw OF ZONING § 2.19 (1968).
5. See 1 CCH POVERTY L. REP. 2855, 2860 (1972).
6. See generally 0. MANDELKER, MANAGING OUR URBAN ENVIRONMENT (2d ed. 1963).
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The last few years, however, have heralded a change in this pat-
tern. The development of personally held and asserted citizen rights
to a quality urban environment can be traced to two developments.
The first development was the gradual expansion of standing to sue.
This expansion in the federal courts was the result of claims pressed
by environmentalists,' and other public litigants.' In state courts,
the broader standing followed the federal trend either by statute9 or
by case law.'0
The second development was the increasing public concern for
maintaining and restoring the quality of the environment. Local
legislators responded to this concern by adopting new laws for main-
taining open space, protecting parks, preserving historic monu-
ments, averting litter, eliminating noise, and requiring air pollution
abatement.
Simultaneously, federal and state laws for environmental protec-
tion evolved, and added to the substantive law structuring govern-
ment and citizen rights in the cities. Most prominent among these
laws was the National Environmental Protection Act'" (NEPA) and
the equivalent environmental assessment laws enacted in two-
thirds of the states. 12
7. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Citizens Comm. for the Hudson
Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal
Power Comm., 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412
U.S. 669 (1972). See also Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1097
(D.C. Cir. 1970) (interests of consumers affected by decision of Secretary of Agriculture
refusing to suspend registration of certain pesticides containing DDT); Reade v. Ewing, 205
F.2d 630, 631-32 (2d Cir. 1953) (interests of consumers of oleomargarine in fair labeling of
product regulated by Federal Security Administration).
9. See, e.g., The Thomas J. Anderson-Gordon Rockwell Environmental Protection Act of
1970, 127 MICH COMP. L. ANN. §§ 691.1201-.1207 (Supp. 1975).
10. Douglaston Civic Ass'n v. Galvin, 36 N.Y.2d 1, 324 N.E.2d 317, 364 N.Y.S.2d 830
(1974). But see Abrams v. New York City Transit Auth., 48 App. Div. 2d 69, 368 N.Y.S.2d
165 (1st Dep't 1975) (parents' group denied opportunity to challenge excessive subway noise
near school for lack of standing to press public rights). See Robinson, Groping Toward Stand-
ing To Sue, 174 N.Y.L.J. 1 (Jan. 27, 1976).
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
12. See, e.g., New York Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA), N.Y. ENVIRONMEN-
TAL CONSERVATION LAW §§ 8-010 to -0115 (McKinney Supp. 1975); Tryzna, A Comparative
Review of State Environmental Impact Laws Within a Federal System, 1 EARTH L.J. 133
(1975). At the municipal level, New York City has enacted its own environmental impact
analysis. New York, N.Y. Executive Order No. 87 (October 18, 1973). This order requires
environmental review for "major projects" such as the construction of a new building with
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Recently citizens finding these new environmental laws ignored
by government agencies have sued to enforce them, and have called
upon courts to fashion decrees and to require that legislative man-
dates be implemented, not subverted. The day has arrived when a
citizen's right to a healthy urban setting should command as much
attention as the safeguarding of natural areas'3 or wildlife.'4 Indeed,
urban environmental law has emerged as a subcategory within the
field of environmental law itself.'5
While articles on the urban environment often deal with statutory
and administrative action, this article presents a different perspec-
tive, that of citizen enforcement and the judicial consequences of
such a development. Illustrative of the emergent role of courts in
enforcing citizens' claims are the areas of historic preservation,
noise regulation, and the use of environmental impact statements.
II. Historic Preservation
When the Supreme Court recognized "aesthetic considerations"
as a significant element of the public welfare, it provided a potential
litigant with an argument that aesthetics, and, specifically, histori-
cally preserved sites, are necessarily part of one's right to a sound
environment. Indeed, since the constitutionality of historic
preservation has been firmly established, a "burgeoning awareness
that our heritage and culture are treasured national assets...""
has evolved. A brief description of preservation laws and their gene-
sis usefully sets the stage for a discussion of a citizen's suit to enforce
such rights.
A. Federal Legislation
Although the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitu-
tional propriety of the government's power to preserve landmarks as
long ago as 1896,'1 it was not until after World War I that the
more than twenty floors, new residential buildings with forty-two or more dwelling units, or
designation of right-of-way for an expressway.
13. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741-42 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting opinion).
14. Udall v. Federal Power Comm., 387 U.S. 428 (1967).
15. For a discussion of the origins and definition of Environmental Law, see Robinson,
Methods and Framework of Environmental Law in the United States, 1 EARTH L.J. 323
(1975).
16. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 174 N.Y.L.J. 1 (1st Dep't Dec. 18,
1975).
17. United States v. Gettysburg Electric Co., 160 U.S. 668 (1896).
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government began inventorying its historic property and enacting
preservation laws. Skilled manpower available in the 1930s pro-
duced the Historic American Buildings Survey which had cata-
logued some 12,000 buildings by 1933. In 1935, Congress enacted an
Historic Sites Act. 8 However, the pace of urban change quickened
and one building after another was replaced.
In the face of rapid razing of historical buildings or areas, Con-
gress established the National Trust for Historic Preservation in
1938 to encourage state and local preservation."8 The use of special-
ized local zoning legislation has developed in communities across
the nation.'" To such local laws have been added some federal enact-
ments, most of them with little or no teeth. Chief among these are
the Historic Preservation Act of 1966,1 the historic protection sec-
tions of the Housing Acts of 1961 and 1965,2 and the Department
of Transportation Act of 1966.3 These federal laws set historic pres-
ervation as a government responsibility. The 1966 Historic Preser-
vation Act authorizes a National Register of Historic Places con-
taining landmarks nominated by state governments, provides for
grants in aid, and requires that the agency involved in any federal
action affecting a registered landmark must "take into account the
effect" of the action and "afford the Advisory Council on Historic
Preservation . . . a reasonable opportunity to comment" on such
effect."
More forceful is the Transportation Act, which mandates that no
historic site can be used unless there is "no feasible and prudent
alternative" and "all possible planning to minimize harm" has been
accomplished. 5 The section has been construed to bar any resort to
historic sites for highway use, and has been used by urban dwellers
to save urban park lands. 8
The Housing Acts encourage historic preservation but lack the
prohibitive bars of the highway legislation. The 1966 Demonstration
Cities and Metropolitan Development Act provides funds for local
18. Act of Aug. 1, 1935, ch. 593, 49 Stat. 666 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 461-70 (1070)).
19. Act of Oct. 26, 1949, ch. 755, 63 Stat. 927 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 468-68e (1970)).
20. See R. ANDERSON, NEW YORK ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 8.46-8.53 (2d ed. 1973).
21. 16 U.S.C. § 470 (1970).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 1500d-1 (1970).
23. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1651-59 (1970).
24. 16 U.S.C. § 470(f) (1970).
25. 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970).
26. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
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surveys of historic sites,2" and has provided grants for urban beauti-
fication and open space. But the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) has been criticized for functioning "with ap-
parent indifference to the destruction of historic sites . . . whenever
local development authorities are prepared to sacrifice those proper-
ties in the interests of urban renewal or other housing programs."2
Essentially, then, historic preservation in the man-made environ-
ment can expect little except aid and comfort from administrative
federal sources. Commitment and action necessarily occurs at the
state and local level.
B. New York Legislation
In an urban context, preservation laws are singularly directed to
the unique and historically significant architecture of a city. The
New York City legislation is, in essence, urban land use regulation
for preserving a key component of environmental quality. Historic
preservation laws, however, tend not to be as encompassing or as
stringent as laws developed to protect the natural environment. 9
This is somewhat anomalous for certainly there is a strong rationale
for enacting comprehensive historic preservation laws locally. More-
over, historic preservation, unlike some natural area preservation
often involves economic benefits which help minimize the due pro-
cess problems of such legislation."
New York City's Landmark Preservation Law was first enacted
in 1965. Adopted pursuant to state enabling legislation," the local
law recognized that the protection of historic buildings and districts
enhances the city's aesthetic, economic, cultural and educational
values. Historic preservation can stabilize property values and ad-
vance civic pride and reputation. 2 Without the Landmark Preserva-
27. 16 U.S.C. § 462 (1970).
28. Gray, The Response of Federal Legislation to Historic Presevation, 36 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 314, 325 (1971).
29. N.Y. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION LAW art. 25 (McKinney Supp. 1975); Robinson,
N. Y. Land Use: Legislature Bans Development On Wetlands, 174 N.Y.L.J. 6 (July 25, 1973).
30. See Note, Land Use Controls in Historical Areas, 44 NOTRE DAME LAW. 379, 387-88
(1969).
31. Law of April 19, 1965, No. 46, [1965] N.Y. Local Laws 261 (codified at NEW YORK,
N.Y. ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 8-A, §§ 205-1.0 to 207-21.0 (1975)) [hereinafter cited as Land-
marks Act]. The Act was passed under the New York Historic Preservation Enabling Act of
1956. Law of April 2, 1956, ch. 216, [1956] N.Y. Laws 246 (now N.Y. GEN. MUNIC. LAW § 96-
a (McKinney Supp. 1975)).
1976]
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tion Law, this heritage was bereft of any legal safeguard.
While some of the preservation techniques have not been tested
in the courts, the statute has weathered and survived attacks on its
constitutionality.13 The Landmark Commission's authority is more
directed and explicit than the powers exercised by other city agen-
cies under the Zoning Resolution. Any site, building or other struc-
ture or area of the city with special character can be designated as
a landmark34 after approval by the Board of Estimate. Staff reports
are prepared on all proposed landmarks, whereupon a public hear-
ing is held,35 and the Commission renders a final report and deci-
sion.
Any alteration to a designated landmark requires application to
the Commission," which then examines whether the proposed act
is consistent with the landmark's architectural mien.37 Public hear-
ings are provided, but informal consultations on changes are encour-
aged so that, through conferences, an agreed course of action may
be achieved. The Preservation Law includes enforcement provisions
and criminal sanctions for altering or demolishing a landmark with-
out permission of the Commission. Fines and imprisonment are
provided for as ultimate sanctions."
This sort of regulatory scheme is the administrative answer to
private suits grounded in aesthetic nuisance theories. 9 While pri-
vate suits are a costly and imprecise tool, the landmark designation
process is not. It permits a sophisticated balancing of interests
within a mandate to preserve the historic, architectural milieu.
As historic preservation laws are strengthened, their relationship
32. The purposes of the Landmarks Act as set out in § 205-1.0(b) are to strengthen the
economy of the city, and promote the use of historic districts for the education, pleasure, and
welfare of the city's residents.
33. See Lutheran Church in America v. City of New York, 35 N.Y.2d 121, 316 N.E.2d 305,
359 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1974); Trustees of the Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Platt, 53 Misc. 2d 933, 280
N.Y.S.2d 75 (Sup. Ct. 1967), rev'd, 29 App. Div. 2d 376, 288 N.Y.S.2d 314 (1st Dep't 1968);
Manhattan Club v. Landmarks Preservation Comm'n., 51 Misc. 2d 556, 273 N.Y.S.2d 848
(Sup. Ct. 1966).
34. Landmarks Act § 207-1.0(k).
35. Id. § 207-12.0(b).
36. Id. § 207-3.0.
37. Id. § 207-8.0(G)(2).
38. Id. § 207-16.0.
39. Noel, Unaesthetic Sights as Nuisances, 25 CORNELL L. Q. 1 (1939); Note, Aesthetic
Nuisance: An Emerging Cause of Action, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1075 (1970).
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to other regulation of the human environment must be considered.
While historic preservation was one of the earliest instances of
"amenity" legislation, it is increasingly recognized as an integral
component of the environmental lawyer's tools. Recently, citizens
have invoked New York City's Landmark Preservation Law to serve
their urban aesthetic goals.
Thus far most private suits in the preservation area have been
brought against the Landmark Commission by owners of landmark
property not realizing a sufficient return. If the plaintiff in such a
case proves an unreasonable economic burden in maintaining the
landmark status, the Act places upon the Commission the burden
of devising a plan whereby the landmark may be preserved and
rendered "capable of earning a reasonable return."4' The thrust and
focus of the Act is to empower the Commission to act on its own
initiative in preserving the city's architecture.
On the other hand, when the relevant agency fails to designate or
protect the landmark, citizens may bring an administrative law
proceeding which is more manageable than a plenary suit at Com-
mon Law. Indeed, it is in this area that citizen suits on behalf of
landmark property have been most appropriate and most frequent.
In Neighborhood Association to Preserve Fifth Avenue Houses,
Inc. v. Spatt4 ' a property owners association and other plaintiffs
challenged the denial by the Landmarks Preservation Commission
of their application to designate East 82nd Street between Fifth and
Madison Avenues in Manhattan an historic district.
Although the Commission had held hearings regarding designa-
tion on a house by house basis, it had denied the block "district"
landmark status without holding a public hearing which would have
given the Association an opportunity to present its views. In defend-
ing its action, the Commission relied on its exercise of discretion and
cited insufficient public interest in the application. When the Com-
mission moved to dismiss the Association's Article 78 proceeding,
the court denied its motion, holding that:42
40. Landmarks Act § 207-1.0(c). A valuation of the "reasonable return" shall be "the
current assessed valuation established by the city, which is in effect at the time of the filing
of the request for a certificate of appropriateness . Id. § 207-1.0(q)(2).
41. 174 N.Y.L.J. 7 (Sup. Ct. Aug. 15, 1975).
42. Id.
19761
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There is demonstrated interest on the part of a group which is directly con-
cerned with the future of this area and its role in conveying an image of this
city and in preserving a part of its past for the citizens of the future. This is
a group, varied in makeup, which has performed a substantial feat at great
expense in time and effort in documenting and publishing the history of the
area in question and in obtaining the support of civic and community leaders
in aid of its goal. There is no question that the issue raised is one of public
interest ....
The vigor of such citizen enforcement is also shown in a matter
which has as yet avoided a court test, the effort to preserve the
Villard Houses in Manhattan. These late 19th century mansions,
which are located immediately behind St. Patrick's Cathedral have
a unique role in the City's history and current atmosphere.43 They
were designated as landmark exteriors by the Commission in 1965.11
The Commission failed to designate the gilded music room or "Gold
Room" of the Whitelaw-Reid Wing of the Villard Houses as an
interior landmark despite its status as the only example of such
architecture in the City.
A developer, the New York Palace Hotel, appeared with a pro-
posal to tear down the back half of the Villard Houses, including the
Gold Room, in order to erect a hotel. The local Community Plan-
ning Board opposed the move,45 but the developer persisted and
filed its application for a variance with the Board of Standards and
Appeals for the City of New York,4" the City's zoning appeals board.
At this point the New York Landmarks Conservancy, a not-for-
profit. corporation dedicated to the preservation and wise use of
landmarks, intervened in the variance proceedings. Although the
site of the Villard Houses is located near both the Special Fifth
Avenue and Madison Avenue Districts, it is located in neither one.
Nonetheless, the Conservancy invoked a provision of the city Zoning
Resolution giving the City Planning Commission rather than the
43. The Villard Houses were designed by McKim, Meade & White, Architects, patterned
after the Roman Palazzo Delle Chancelleria, at the request of Henry Villard, in 1883. Their
history and value have been frequently noted, Ellis, Very Special Place For Special Peo-
ple-Church Publisher Neighbors, N.Y. World Telegram, July 1, 1960, at 15, col. 3; Huxtable,
They Call this 'Saving' a Landmark?, N.Y. Times, Jan 5, 1975, at D29, col. 1.
44. Landmarks Preservation Commission of the City of New York, Certificate of Appro-
priateness No. 364, Henry Villard Houses.
45. N.Y. Times, June 6, 1975, at 35, col. 1.
46. Application for Variance on Behalf of the Archbishopric of New York, No. 693-74-BZ
(Bd. of Standards and Appeals of the City of N.Y., filed Nov. 26, 1974).
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Board of Standards and Appeals jurisdiction over lots containing
areas equivalent to that proposed for the hotel. 7 The developer then
withdrew its variance application and entered into negotiations
with the Conservancy and the City Planning Commission to explore
a compromise. To date, the City Planning Commission has not yet
acted.
Thus, where the Landmarks Commission has failed to protect
historic areas, as in the Fifth Avenue case, or has not protected the
resource sufficiently, as was the case with the Gold Room of the
Villard Houses, citizens have readily stepped in. While historic
preservation legislation was not designed to encourage citizen par-
ticipation, it permits contributions from the public either in the
form of judicial challenge or through independent action.
III. Noise Abatement
The last five years have produced extensive new laws at the local,
state and federal levels to regulate noise and create causes of action
for noise related injury,48 and even to impose criminal sanctions for
excessive noise.49 These recent statutes and ordinances were
adopted against the background of long standing common law reme-
dies which had ceased to be sufficiently effective. ° They represent
an attempt to combat a pervasive hazard more effectively than was
possible under common law. In the wake of these trends a new area
of urban environmental law has emerged.
47. New York, N.Y. Zoning Resolution § 74-72.
48. As of 1972, there were between 1,500 and 2,000 state and local noise control codes. 61
AM. JUR. 2d Pollution Control § 111 (1972). On the local level, see CHICAGO, lLL., MUNICIPAL
CODE § 17-1.6 to -4.21 (1970), discussed in Grad & Hack, Noise Control in the Urban
Environment, 1972 URBAN LAW ANNUAL 3, 14 (1972). That statute requires that manufacturers
who sell specified vehicles and other equipment in Chicago to certify that their equipment
meets prescribed noise emission standards. On the state level, see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §
403.061(13) (1973); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-01-17 (Supp. 1975), which authorize the air and
water pollution control agencies of their respective states to establish noise standards.
49. See, e.g., NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE §§ 1403.3-1.01 to -8.25 (1975).
50. See generally. Comment, The New York City Noise Control Code: Not With a Bang
But With A Whisper, 1 FORDHAM URBAN L. J. 446, 447-51 (1973). Until the enactment of the
New York City Noise Code in 1972, local citizens had only partial success in enforcing existing
noise laws due in large part to the lack of established measureable standards to judge noise
pollution. The police department has always had the right to enforce laws against noise
polluters but such actions were a low priority problem for the department. Mayor Lindsay
appointed a task force to study the problem of noise in New York City and the group's report
helped spark passage of the 1972 Code. Id. at 449.
1976] 475
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When the harmful effects of noise were little understood, the nuis-
ance doctrine afforded uneven protection. Nuisance or trespass
theories often result in a balancing of equities with a judgment not
wholly satisfactory to either party. Damages may be awarded; and
in cases where a governmental agency produces the noise, courts
have held that there has been a confiscation of property rights.5'
Yet, money awards alone do not remedy the problem. While nuis-
ance actions can result in injunctive relief removing the noise, they
can also result in money damages alone without the equitable relief
primarily sought.5 2 Rather than leave the aggrieved citizen to com-
mon law remedies, statutes were enacted to provide private enforce-
ment of the right to eliminate unwanted noise.
At the federal level, noise laws have vastly expanded both envi-
ronmental rights and their enforcement. Federal noise laws regulate
noise levels in places of employment. They also regulate aviation
noise and noise levels in machinery sold in interstate commerce.
While the occupational noise standards are promulgated under
OSHA,53 and the Federal Aviation Authority sets noise emission
standards from aircraft,54 it is in the regulation of machinery noise
levels where the greatest latitude is provided for citizen enforce-
ment. Indeed, it is the area of broadest prohibition and the relevant
statute, the Noise Control Act of 1972,11 specifically provides for
citizen suits.
51. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946). In Causby, the Court said that the
fifth amendment of the Constitution required the Federal Government to pay for air-
space taken from a private citizen and rejected the landowner's common law argument that
ownership of the land extended to the periphery. Id. at 260-61. See also Griggs v. Allegheny
Co., 369 U.S. 84 (1962). For a case involving a state statute, see Aaron v. Los Angeles, 40
Cal. App. 3d 471, 115 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1974).
52. This is particularly true in government air space confiscation cases. See Town of East
Haven v. Eastern Airlines, Inc. 333 F. Supp. 338 (D. Conn. 1971).
53. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1970). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1910.95, Table G-16 (1975). Sample
permissible sound levels include 6 hours at 92 decibels, 4 hours at 95 decibels, 1 hour at 105
decibels, and /4 hour or less at 115 decibels. Id.
54. The Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 4906 (Supp. IV, 1974), 49 U.S.C. § 1431
(Supp. IV, 1974). The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) must consult with the Environ-
mental Protection Administration (EPA) before prescribing and recommending standards.
The EPA must then submit the proposed regulations to the FAA. The FAA may accept,
modify or reject the EPA proposals. If it does modify or reject, the EPA may request a review.
49 U.S.C. §§ 1431 (c)(1),(2) (Supp. IV, 1974).
55. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4901-18 (Supp. IV, 1974), 49 U.S.C. § 1431 (Supp. IV, 1974).
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A. The Noise Control Act of 1972
In 1970, the Noise Pollution and Abatement Act5" was enacted to
promote research into all aspects of noise. In addition, where the
federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator de-
termined that a federal agency's -acts created unwanted noise, the
Act required that agency to consult with the EPA concerning abate-
ment.57
In 1972, Congress concluded that noise problems created by vehi-
cles, construction equipment and other machinery used in interstate
commerce ought to be regulated uniformly. Pursuant to that deci-
sion it enacted the Noise Control Act of 1972,8 which sets noise
emission standards for such products in interstate commerce" other
than aircraft and military items.'" "Environmental Noise" is
broadly defined as the "intensity, duration and the character of
sounds from all sources."'" The Act requires the EPA Administrator
to set criteria for identifying different noise qualities and quantities
and their impact on public health.12 He must then set noise emission
standards for major sources of noise, after considering the economic
possibilities of noise reduction. The manufacturer must warrant
that its product will conform to the federal emission standards at
the time of sale. 3 Thus, warranty is for manufacturing defects only.
The user is responsible for using the product in its normal way with
normal maintenance.6 4  1
The Act's thrust is toward manufacturers but users may be sub-
ject to more stringent local laws depending on the circumstances.
Thus, the Act allows more specific local laws, such as New York
City's Noise Code, to continue in force, except where they deal with
56. 42 U.S.C. § 1858 (1970).
57. Id. § 1858(c). When compiling their NEPA impact statements, see 42 U.S.C. § 4332
(1970), the heads of all federal agencies should ensure that all facilities under their jurisdic-
tion are designed, constructed, managed, operated and maintained to conform to the Stan-
dard of the Noise Control Act of 1972. Exec. Order No. 11,752, 3 C.F.R. 380-85 (1974).
58. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4901-18 (Supp. IV, 1974), 49 U.S.C. § 1431 (Supp. IV, 1974).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 4905 (Supp. IV, 1974).
60. For aircraft regulations, see 42 U.S.C. § 4906 (Supp. IV, 1974); 49 U.S.C. § 1431
(Supp. IV, 1974).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 4902(11) (Supp. IV, 1974).
62. Id. § 4904(a).
63., Id. § 4905(d)(1).
64. S. REP. No. 1160, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1972).
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FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
the design-related noise emission of machinery. 5
The enforcement provisions of the Act are similar to those of the
Clean Air Act"6 and include both fines and imprisonment as penal-
ties. First offender violators may be fined up to $25,000 or impris-
oned for one year, and any violator may be subject to an injunc-
tion. 7 Most significantly, the Act creates a civil cause of action for
"any person" to restrain any other person, including a governmental
agency, from violating a federal noise standard or to require enforce-
ment of such a standard. The Court may award the costs of litiga-
tion including reasonable attorney and witness fees;"6 such a provi-
sion substantially undercuts the discouraging cost factor of citizen
suit litigation. Moreover nothing restricts the individual's right to
sue under common law or any other statute.7 ° Before a citizen sues
a federal or state governmental agency to enforce noise rights, he
must first give sixty days notice of intent to sue,7 and the notice
must recite the nature of the alleged violation. Since these citizen
suit and notice provisions have only recently become effective, there
is not sufficient data for analysis.
B. New York City Noise Code
Illustrative of local legislation is the New York City Noise Code7 '
which provides for citizen enforcement of its provisions and actively
relies on citizen protests and reports. New York's Noise Control
Code of 1972 is a model of vigorous legislation intended to remedy
the absence of noise regulation. The Code codifies the common law
ban on "unnecessary noise"73 and specifically defines "prohibitive
noise"'" from vehicle exhausts and other sources. The Code contem-
plates the setting of noise levels for aircraft, railroads, subways,
65. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4905(e)(1)(A),(B) (Supp. IV, 1974).
66. Compare id. § 4910 with Clean Air Act, id. § 1857(c-8)(c) (1970).
67. Id. § 4901 (Supp. IV, 1974).
68. The EPA may intervene in such actions. Id. § 4911(c).
69. Id. § 4911(d).
70. Id. § 4911(e). These provisions substantially duplicate the federal citizen suit authori-
zations of the Clean Air Act, id. § 1857(h-2) (1970) and the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (Supp. IV, 1974).
71. 39 Fed. Reg. 36011 (1974).
72. NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE §§ 1403.3-1.01 to -8.25 (1975).
73. Id. § 1403.3-1.03 (1975).
74. Id. § 1403.3-3.01.
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trucks, and various other noise producing systems. 5
Enforcement of the Code is through complaints to the New York
City Environmental Control Board, and administrative court. The
Board may issue subpoenas, order the installation of noise control
equipment, issue cease and desist orders, impose civil penalties up
to $1,000 per day, and revoke permits or variances.
Any citizen may initiate enforcement proceedings and the City
Department of Air Resources provides a kit with forms for filing a
formal "Citizens Noise Complaint Affidavit" and offers a bounty of
25 percent of any fine assessed to the complainant. While citizen
complaints give the aggrieved individual an outlet for prosecution
of noise violators, the Environmental Control Board docket is so
crowded and its follow-up so limited that real relief may not be
immediately forthcoming. Still, the force of eventual fines has pro-
vided incentive for noise abatement, as well as the possibility of
private suits alleging damages. Furthermore, the Code has created
standards of illegality which may be treated as nuisances per se by
plaintiffs.
C. Problems in Noise Control Litigation
While noise control has become an integral aspect of environmen-
tal quality, the battle toward reaching the various statutes' objec-
tives will not be without problems. Noise laws, like other urban
environmental laws, do not easily mesh with other older urban val-
ues and vested interests. The trade-off issues presented are an in-
structive example of conflicts along the way to a noise-free city.
The problem of harmonizing environmental laws with other poli-
cies is well illustrated by New York Telephone Co. v. New York City
Transportation Administration." In this suit against New York
City, New York Telephone Empire City Subway Co., Ltd., Consoli-
dated Edison Co. of New York, Inc., and the Brooklyn Union Gas
Co. attacked amendments to the City Department of Highways
Rules regulating street openings.7 1 One of the amendments prohib-
75. Id. §§ 1403.3-4.01 to -4.23, -5.01 to -5.23.
76. The section of the Code dealing with the functioning of the Environmental Control
Board is NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § 1403.3-8.01 (1975). There is also a section in the
Code dealing with citizen complaints. Id. § 1403.3-8.09.
77. 44 App. Div. 2d 784, 355 N.Y.S. 2d 6 (1st Dep't 1974).
78. NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § 1403.3-4.11 (1975).
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ited any work on subsurface installations in eighty-one named
streets on weekdays between 7 a.m. and 7 p.m. (daylight), with
exceptions provided for inspection and emergency work. The Com-
mission of Highways may declare an emergency upon application if
interruption of a public utility or sanitation service might result
from having to postpone a street opening to a weekend. In "undue
hardship" cases the Commissioner may waive or modify the regula-
tions to accommodate specific cases.
The City adopted these rules pursuant to the transportation con-
trols required by the Federal Clean Air Act and the New York State
approved "New York City Metropolitan Area Air Quality Imple-
mentation Plan Transportation Controls,"7 a plan approved by the
United States Environmental Protection Agency. 0 The City, con-
sidering itself bound by the state and federal law requiring transpor-
tation controls, asserted that its discretion had been preempted and
that such street opening rules were mandated. Plaintiffs argued that
the Department of Highways rules were unrelated to the Plan, and,
further, that the "daylight" rule is an abuse of the City's police
power in that it conflicts with, and seriously impairs, the New York
State mandate to utilities to provide certain public services without
interruption."' Moreover, plaintiffs alleged that the Rule conflicted
with the City's Noise Control Code."2 That Code bans construction
on weekends and on weekdays between 6 p.m. and 7 a.m. (night)
under city permit. 3 Variances for "public safety" reasons may be
granted by any City agency, 4 although, in emergencies, none are
required for a twelve hour period.
The Supreme Court of New York County granted the utility
plaintiffs a preliminary injunction against the Department of High-
79. This latter report was issued by the New York State Dept. of Environmental Conser-
vation in April 1973. 44 App. Div. 2d at 785-86, 355 N.Y.S. 2d at 7-8.
80. See note 157 infra.
81. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW §§ 65, 91 (McKinney 1955); N.Y. TRANSP. CORP. LAW
§§ 11, 27 (McKinney 1943). The Public Service Commission appeared as amicus curiae on
behalf of the utilities initially and on appeal. New York Tel. Co. v. New York City Transp.
Admin., 44 App. Div. 2d 784, 355 N.Y.S.2d 6 (1st Dep't 1974).
82. NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § 1403.3-4.11(a) (1975) which allows construction only
on weekdays between the hours of 7 A.M. and 6 P.M.
83. Id. § 1403.3-4.11.
84. Id. § 1403.3-4.11(b).
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ways Rules on street openings while denying a motion to dismiss.
The utilities had successfully contended that they could not fulfill
their normal maintenance work and abide by the amended rules.
The Appellate Division for the First Department affirmed 6 but
declined to take judicial notice or (impliedly) to consider the federal
preemption issues since the plan for transportation controls was not
a part of the record below. 7
In a separate concurring opinion, Judge Kupferman observed that
the utilities' attack was on the Highway Rules rather than on the
Noise Code: "They are not generally desirous of having night time
work due to union problems and overtime pay, muggings, [and]
not finding nearby customers open .... "I'
Most significant for the purpose of this discussion, however, is the
recognition which Judge Kupferman gave to the public policy trade-
offs:"9
Obviously, the legislative and executive branches have an obligation to help
prevent air polution and noise pollution and yet also to allow the utilities
promptly to perform their duties. Where there is a possible conflict in the
achievement of these ends, the court should not intervene unless the resolu-
tion of the conflict is arbitrary and unreasonable . . . . Although yet to be
demonstrated, it may be that the utilities involved will have additional ex-
penses, but this is part of the social cost of having a more livable environment
. . . . The danger inherent in having uninspected utility facilities, such as
gas lines, is readily apparent, and the problem requires careful consideration,
but in proper perspective.
What Judge Kupferman views as a "proper perspective" is both
perspicacious and time-tested. As Chief Judge Breitel has written
with respect to New York City's local law regulating emissions from
,fuel burners and refuse incinerators, resolution of thorny regulatory
problems can proceed even by trial and error., The justification for
such experimental efforts is the fact that "[u]nfortunately, the
extent of the pollution problem, its life-threatening acceleration,
and the high economic and social costs of control are exceeded in
gravity by only one or two other domestic or even international
issues."9
85. 44 App. Div. 2d at 784, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 7.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 785, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 8.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 786, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 8-9.
90. Oriental Boulevard Co. v. Heller, 27 N.Y.2d 212, 219, 265 N.E.2d 72, 75, 316 N.Y.S.2d
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While the curb on certain weekday street openings would reduce
traffic congestion and thereby aid commerce as well as curb air
pollution, it is true that some new costs would accrue to the utili-
ties." These, in turn, are likely to be passed on to the rate-paying
public. The real question is whether they should be allowed to so
tax the public since, it is the "right of the public to the use of the
streets which is 'absolute and paramount.'" Private abutters have
no such right.2 A franchised utility's interest in streets is arguably
no less subservient to the public's right of use.
Regretfully, a considered balancing of these issues was delayed
when trial was postponed. The public was the loser in not having a
prompt adjudication of these issues. The Highway Department con-
templated permit-by-permit evaluation of trade-offs for street open-
ings. Its rules were consistent with the Clean Air Act. 3 Moreover, a
Noise Code variance could be given for the "urgent necessity" of
reducing air pollution and traffic congestion. 4 Since a compatible
statutory interpretation was possible, the utilities might have
served the public better by working under the rules rather than
seeking their invalidation in limine. Ultimately, the trade-off issue
here is one for administrative action and legislative amelioration
and refinement in light of practice. Courts can proceed only so far.
"So long as there is reasonable basis in available information, and
rationality in chosen courses of conduct to alleviate an accepted
evil, there is no constitutional infirmity.""g
IV. NEPA and the City
The requirements for environmental impact statements have ad-
vanced the ability of a citizen to protect himself from unanticipated
environmental harm at the hands of federal agencies. The urban
226, 230 (1970).
91. Such increased costs would accrue in the form of overtime pay for employees, union
problems, and increased security for workers. App. Div. 2d at 785, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 8.
92. Cities Service Oil Co. v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 110, 115, 154 N.E.2d 814, 816,
180 N.Y.S.2d 769, 772 (1958).
93. See Exxon Corp. v. City of New York, 356 F. Supp. 660 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (N.Y.C. can
control amount of lead in gasoline sold within city); Allway Taxi, Inc. v. City of New York,
340 F. Supp. 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (ordinance regulation exhaust emission controls for li-
censed cabs found not to be pre-empted).
94. N w YORK. N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § 1403.3-4.11(b) (1975).
95. Oriental Boulevard Co. v. Heller, 27 N.Y.2d 212, 219, 265 N.E.2d 72, 75, 316 N.Y.S.2d
226, 230 (1970).
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NEPA cases reached important new dimensions in recent years. A
review of the cases in and around New York evidences how
important and open-ended the analysis of environmental impact
has become today. The vindication of rights for an urban com-
munity "beautiful as well as healthy"96 has been made more realis-
tic than ever before.
A. Chelsea Case
In Chelsea Neighborhood Association v. United States Postal
Service the District Court for the Southern District of New York
ruled that the U.S. Postal Service had not properly adhered to the
National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) in proposing con-
struction of a Vehicle Maintenance Facility (VMF) in the Chelsea
neighborhood of Manhattan.97 Judge Ward's opinion was affirmed
by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. 8
Prior to the Chelsea case NEPA had been invoked in a series of
challenges to the new Federal House of Detention being built behind
the U.S. Courthouse in Foley Square.99 In Hanly v. Kleindienstl°°
the Second Circuit required strict adherence to NEPA's purposes
and procedures, but on the facts, no serious environmental adverse
impact was present in the proposed new detention center."" The
Chelsea case is a more sophisticated and meritorious instance of
NEPA's utility.
The Postal Service's VMF clearly raised serious environmental
health and safety issues. The Postal Service had prepared an Envi-
ronmental Impact Statement (EIS); but when neighborhood resi-
dents challenged the sufficiency of the EIS, the Service contended
that it was not required to comply with NEPA.92 The district court
disagreed, and in a ruling of first impression held the Postal Service
subject to NEPA.
96. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
97. 389 F. Supp. 1171 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 516 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1975).
98. Id.
99. Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973);
Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990 (1972). Judge Mansfield
decided Kleindienst and Judge Feinberg decided Mitchell.
100. 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973).
101. Id. at 828-36.
102. 389 F. Supp. at 1175-76.
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Although NEPA expressly applies to "all agencies of the Federal
Government, '"13 many agencies have resisted embracing the
Congressional mandate."'4 The Postal Service raised the unique
objection that the Postal Reorganization Act' 5 exempted the Serv-
ice from the environmental mandate, but the court ruled that
"[tihere is nothing in the language of § 410 on its face which
prohibits or makes impossible application of such a broad expres-
sion of overriding national policy as NEPA.' '" In addition, the court
noted the Service's failure to examine all alternatives to the VMF
as NEPA requires. In addition, there was insufficient study of the
VMF's impact on the neighborhood and on the proposed apartment
complex to be built above the facility. 107
Finally, the court took a telling look at what may be viewed as a
beginning of "urban sociological law."''0 In its final analysis of the
procedural inadequacy of the EIS the court noted:00
[N]owhere does the EIS give meaningful consideration to the problems
posed by such high density dwellings, containing large open space, com-
pletely isolated from the surrounding environment. These are problems
which will affect both the project residents and the Chelsea neighborhood in
general. For example, crime and crime control are problems which have an
environmental impact which must be considered in detail.
The procedural inadequacies of the Postal Service EIS were suffi-
cient to justify a preliminary injunction barring construction con-
tracts for the VMF. The circuit court's affirmance agreed that "the
Service has failed to meet the requirements of NEPA in making 'a
careful and informed decision.' "0 Among the deficiencies of the
Postal Service EIS, the court of appeals cited and described the
103. National Environmental Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (1970).
104. See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. United States Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Some agencies still resist. See, e.g., Robinson,
Extraterritorial Environmental Protection Obligation of the Foreign Affairs Agencies: The
Unfulfilled Mandate of NEPA, 7 N.Y.U. J. INT. L. & POLITICs 257 (1974).
105. According to the Postal Reorganization Act, 39 U.S.C. § 410(a) (1970), federal laws
and regulations, with a few specific exceptions, do not apply to the Postal Service. NEPA is
not one of the federal laws that specifically applies to the Postal Service. 39 U.S.C. §
410(b)(Supp. 1974).
106. 389 F. Supp. at 1179.
107. Id. at 1180-81.
108. Letter from Albert K. Butzel of Butzel & Kass (attorneys for the plaintiffs) to
Nicholas A. Robinson, March 4, 1975.
109. 389 F. Supp. at 1184 (citations omitted).
110. 516 F.2d at 389.
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sociological issue: "We do not know whether informed social scien-
tists would conclude that the top of the VMF would likely become
a human jungle, unsafe at night and unappealing during the day.'
B. Westchester County Courthouse
Similar urban social issues came into play in the lengthy and
considered opinion which enjoined destruction of the six-building
complex constituting the Westchester County Courthouse." 2 The
Courthouse was scheduled for demolition in the urban renewal of
downtown White Plains, but subsequently was included in the Na-
tional Register of Historic Places under the National Historic Pres-
ervation Act (NHPA)."3 Before federal funds are used in a project
which affects an historic site listed in the National Register, NHPA
requires that the federal agency afford the Advisory Council on
Historic Preservation opportunity "to comment.""' When read with
NEPA, the duties of HUD were broadly construed. HUD's failure
to review whether demolition of the courthouse was a major federal
action significantly affecting the environment, was held to be "both
substantively and procedurally defective under NEPA."' '
The district court closely adhered both to NEPA's requirements
and the Hanly decision, and left the scope of what remained to be
examined broad. While the range of interdisciplinary factors HUD
will explore cannot be predicted, it is certain that some evaluation
will be required where none was proffered before.
C. Trinity Case
The broader scope of NEPA relief was further emphasized in
recent rulings in Manhattan's urban renewal area. Trinity Episco-
pal School Corp. v. Romney"' has significance in the development
of urban applications of environmental law, and as a probing of the
reach of other duties under the National Environmental Protection
Act. The plaintiffs in the Trinity case included a non-sectarian
111. Id. at 388.
112. Save The Court House v. Lynn, No. 75-6005 (2d Cir. April 30, 1975).
113. 16 U.S.C. § 470 (1970).
114. 16 U.S.C. § 470(f) (1970). Exec. Order No. 11,593, 36 Fed. Reg. 8921 (1971) requires
adherence to these provisions.
115. No. 75-6005, at 50.
116. 523 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1975), remanding 387 F. Supp. 1044 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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private school, a committee of neighborhood residents, and
individuals from the upper west side of Manhattan. They claimed,
inter alia, that the West Side Urban Renewal Plan was modified
without compliance with NEPA. The Plan and its impact are exten-
sively set forth in the district court opinion."7
Trinity School had agreed to sponsor a site next to its facilities
(Site 30) on the understanding that the Plan would include at most
some 2,500 low-income housing units and that in middle-income
buildings the units would be allocated thirty percent to low-income
tenants and seventy percent to middle-income tenants. The suit was
precipitated by a redesignation of Site 30 from middle to low-
income housing. Plaintiffs claimed that the redesignation would
cause the area to deteriorate from the projected mixed middle-class
neighborhood to a ghetto. Relying on Otero v. New York City Hous-
ing Authority,"' they contended that the change in Site 30 would
mean that the area would "tip" from a middle to a low-income area,
lose racial and economic integration, and produce an increase in
crime, noise, and other anti-social activity."9
The district court concluded that the evidence as to tipping was
too imprecise to permit a finding that the changes in the Plan would
tip the neighborhood. It reviewed the evidence in terms of (1) gross
numbers of minority or low-income families, (2) quality of com-
munity services, and (3) attitudes of majority group families as to
whether they would leave the area.2 0 Despite 25 trial days and ex-
tensive factual and expert testimony the district court concluded
that "no meaningful proof exists in the trial record that the presence
of that class [low income residents] is per se a cause of neighbor-
hood deterioration."' 2 This finding was buttressed by two HUD
studies showing that the change in Site 30 would not have a signifi-
cant adverse impact on the environment.'
The district court expressly found that "[C]ommunity attitudes
and fears, or the prospensity of certain economic or racial groups to
commit anti-social behavior, do not lend themselves to . . . objec-
117. 387 F. Supp. at 1048-53.
118. 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973).
119. 387 F. Supp. at 1064-65.
120. Id. at 1065.
121. Id. at 1073.
122. Id. at 1073-75.
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tive analysis and are not required in a NEPA study."'23 Moreover,
it ruled that HUD's Special Environmental Clearance 4 which con-
cluded that the project would not have a significant adverse impact
on the environment had satisfied the mandate of NEPA as well as
HUD's guidelines. 125
The Second Circuit refused to hold that the district court's con-
clusions of fact were clearly erroneous,2 6 but the plaintiffs did suc-
cessfully contend that, as a matter of law, HUD's conduct did not
satisfy NEPA. The court of appeals held that NEPA (1) required
HUD to make its own independent review of alternatives and not
merely accept City Housing Authority conclusions, and (2) man-
dated a full review of alternatives irrespective of the obligation of
filing an EIS.
In outlining the urban factors which must be examined with re-
spect to a project such as the Site 30 apartments, the court included
"site selection and design; density; displacement and relocation;
impact of the environment on current residents and their activities;
decay and blight; implications for the city growth policy; traffic and
parking; noise; neighborhood stability; and the existence of services
and commercial enterprises to service the new residents.' 2 7
Against such factual review, the court stated that HUD must
study: 28
alternative locations or sites; alternative of not building; alternative designs
both in use of site and in size of individual units and number of total units;
dispersal of the low income units or more sites in the project area; alternative
measures for compensating or mitigating environmental impacts; and alter-
natives requiring action of a significantly different nature which would pro-
vide similar benefits with different impacts such as rehabilitation of existing
buildings in the area as public housing projects.
Moreover, the court ruled that "[t]he statement of possible
alternatives, the consequences thereof and the facts and reasons for
and against is HUD's task."'2 9
123. Id. at 1078-79.
124. This is required for apartment projects with 100 or more units (Site 30 had 160
units) under HUD Circular 1385.1, 37 Fed. Reg. 22,673 (1972).
125. 387 F. Supp. at 1081-82.
126. 523 F.2d at 92.
127. Id. at 93.
128. Id. at 94.
129. Id.
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The circuit court did not directly decide whether community atti-
tudes and fears are a proper subject for a NEPA study. It did specu-
late, however, that testimony by area witnesses on crime, drugs,
vandalism, and other evidence of anti-social behavior 3 ' "might well
influence the appropriate housing agency to endeavor to minimize
these dangers in its 'alternative' recommendations."'' Thus it
appears that subjective factors relevant to "tipping" may also be
considered in connection with the wide range of alternatives which
must be studied.
What remains to be seen is how an interdisciplinary approach will
be used to study alternatives. The circuit court remanded the case
to the district court to require a study by the appropriate agencies
of possible "alternatives" regarding the proposed change in Site
30.132 Critique of how such a study is to be accomplished necessarily
will involve whether HUD has satisfied section 102(2)(a) (obliging
it to utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach) as well as
section 102(2)(D) (which mandates developing alternatives). As the
foregoing suggests, this may be a far more sophisticated undertaking
than the house of detention review in the Hanly cases presented.' 3
Like the Chelsea case, consideration of subjective factors may re-
quire the expertise of sociologists, as well as anthropologists and
psychologists.
It is this aspect of the ruling which gives it precedential import-
ance. Moreover, as New York State moves to implement its State
Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA), 31 and other states
apply their "little NEPA's," this NEPA construction may well be
carried over to SEQRA, and all city and state agencies may find
themselves engaged in the urban sociological examinations presaged
in the Chelsea case and the Trinity ruling.
V. Procedural Problems: Ripeness
Just as a court's narrow interpretation of "standing" recently
barred citizens from contesting excessive subway noise, 31 so a nig-
130. 387 F. Supp. at 1069.
131. 523 F.2d at 95.
132. Id.
133. See text accompanying notes 103-104 supra.
134. Act of Aug. 1, 1975, N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 612 (McKinney's 1975).
135. Abrams v. New York City Transit Auth., 48 App. Div. 2d 69, 368 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1st
Dep't 1975).
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gardly view as to when an issue is ready for judicial review can stall
vindication of public rights. The question of the point at which a
party threatened with environmental injury may seek redress in the
courts was highlighted in 1974 by two New York County Supreme
Court rulings involving the proposed West Side Manhattan conven-
tion center of the New York City Convention and Exhibition Corpo-
ration (Corporation).
In Gottfried v. New York City Convention and Exhibition Center
Corporation'36 Judge Greenfield denied petitions under Article 78
of New York's Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) which alleged,
inter alia, that the Corporation's Development Plan for the conven-
tion center failed to conform to New York City's "comprehensive"
plan and failed to examine the adverse public health effects and
other environmental impact generated by the center. The City Plan-
ning Commission and the Board of Estimate, in approving the De-
velopment Plan, had made specific findings that it was in conform-
ity with the comprehensive plan for the municipality as a whole. 37
However, petitioners claimed that such a finding could not have
been made because no environmental impact studies had been un-
dertaken or completed prior to presenting the Plan to them for
approval. Nevertheless the court decided that the future impact was
difficult to anticipate, and that studies being done as the project
was developed was sufficient to comply with the provisions in the
law.138
The Gottfried special proceeding was brought by a state Assem-
blyman for the Assembly District in which the proposed convention
center site is located, by four residents of the neighborhood, and the
New York Coliseum Exhibition Corporation, a potential competitor
of the respondent corporation.
A separate Article 78 Proceeding was commenced by a citizens'
organization, the Coalition for Clean Air by 1975. Justice Greenfield
136. Gottfried v. New York City Convention and Exhibition Center Corp., Index No.
13,184/73 (N.Y. County, Sup. Ct. Aug. 29, 1974).
137. The corporation is created and governed by Act of July 2, 1971, ch. 1011, [1971] N.Y.
Laws 1691, as amended, Act of July 2, 1971, ch. 1009-10, [1971] N.Y. Laws 1689; Act of June
8, 1972, ch. 926, [1972] N.Y. Laws 3753. Sections 6(1), 6(2), and 6(4) of this act require in
relevant part that the Corporation's Development Plan must conform to "a comprehensive
plan for the development of the municipality as a whole."
138. Index No. 13,184/73, at 23.
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also denied this petition to enjoin the project.' '9 Petitioners had
urged that (1) the Corporation was proceeding to construction with-
out a permit, (2) the New York State Commissioner of Environmen-
tal Conservation had failed to halt construction and, (3) increased
traffic would pollute the air thus impairing public health. 40
The court ruled that the Coalition's petition was "premature and
legally insufficient.""'4 No construction had begun. No permits were
needed. No injury was present or immediately forseeable. The court
declined to enjoin any party on the basis of the charge of "anticipa-
tory violation of the law."'4
Several important environmental quality issues were raised by
these suits. The first was the air quality deterioration. The second
was whether all aspects of neighborhood protection had been consid-
ered and whether the center conformed to the city's zoning and
comprehensive planning.'
Although the corporation was not required in haec verba to do an
environmental impact analysis for the center, it was obliged by law
to evaluate the "relationship between the [center's] development
plan and a comprehensive plan for the development of the munici-
pality as a whole."'4 In turn, the City Planning Commission was to
"certify. . . whether the development plan. . . conforms to a com-
prehensive plan"', and then the Board of Estimate was by resolu-
tion to decide whether "the development plan conforms to a com-
prehensive plan."'46
The petitioners claimed that air pollution, traffic and neighbor-
hood impact should have been reviewed as part of the required
conformity with the comprehensive plan. The Corporation main-
tained that all these environmental evaluations could be done after
its development plan was approved.'47
Judge Greenfield reconciled these positions as follows:'40
139. Coalition for Clean Air by 1975 v. New York City Convention and Exhibition Center
Corp., 172 N.Y.L.J. 17 (Sup. Ct. Sept. 6, 1974).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See note 137 supra and accompanying text.
144. Act of July 2, 1971, ch. 1011, [1971] N.Y. Laws 1691.
145. Id. § 6(2).
146. Id. § 6(4).
147. 172 N.Y.L.J. at 17.
148. Id.
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It is difficult to comprehend how there can be definitive statements as to the
total environmental impact of a future project when so many variables and
contingencies can alter the outlook.
The court deferred to the expertise of the Planning Commission
which found that the Corporation's development plan conformed to
a comprehensive city plan. It did so apparently in the face of "con-
flicting factual claims," and a record revealing that the only envi-
ronmental study was a twenty-two page statement entitled
"Preliminary Statement of Environmental Effects."'49
Put bluntly, the court acknowledged that petitioners had shown
that no serious environmental protection studies had been under-
taken prior to asking city approval of a major convention center and
plan which included a city capital budget authorization of fifty
million dollars to begin construction of the center. Nonetheless, the
court told the petitioners, that it was not yet timely to raise these
environmental issues.'""
The ripeness issue is one which has been litigated in federal court
environmental cases. These rulings can offer some guidance in the
Convention Center context. Where a statute clearly evidences a
legislative policy of "ecology preservation," a court is reluctant to
find laches.'5 ' In the "comprehensive plan" for the development
of the municipality, environmental issues increasingly are held rele-
vant.'52 Nonetheless, as Judge Greenfield's ruling reveals, the man-
date to include environmental protection in such a comprehensive
plan is less than uniformly admitted. Thus, failure to seek judicial
review at this juncture raises the possibility of a finding of laches
at a later date.'5 3
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See Steubing v. Brinegar, 511 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1975); Arlington Coalition on Transp.
v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1000 (1972).
152. See generally, Nattin Realty, Inc. v. Ludewig, 324 N.Y.S.2d 668 (Sup. Ct. 1971),
aff'd, 40 App. Div. 2d 535, 334 N.Y.S.2d 483 (2d Dep't 1972), aff'd mem., 32 N.Y.2d 681,
296 N.E.2d 256, 343 N.Y.S.2d 360 (1970) (local zoning 6rdinance was required to take into
consideration ecological problems such as effect of change of zoning on local water supply and
sewage disposal facilities). Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 463, 235 N.E.2d 897, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888
(1968), deals more with land use and not quite as clearly with environmental problems.
153. Respondents argued that by seeking a stay on September 5, 1973 when petitioners
commenced the proceedings the passage of time alone subjected them to charges of laches.
Memorandum for Respondents at 15-17, Gottfried v. New York City Convention and Exhibi-
tion Corp., Index No. 13,184/73 (N.Y. County, Sup. Ct. Aug. 29, 1974).
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In declining to stay the center operations, or to fashion sua sponte
an intermediate remedy compelling environmental studies in
connection with the comprehensive plan, the court ruled that the
relief was sought too early, and dismissed the petitions. In a compa-
rable NEPA case, Silva v. Romney,'54 the First Circuit Court of
Appeals agreed that the district court had the power to enjoin HUD
from approving a $4 million mortgage guarantee and $156,000 inter-
est grant pending preparation of an environmental impact state-
ment. In the case of federal highway construction, the mere acquisi-
tion by a state government of land for a federal highway route re-
quired environmental impact analysis under NEPA because it
"would make proceeding with the proposed route increasingly easier
and, therefore, a decision to alter or abandon the route increasingly
undesirable.' ' 55
In a close analysis of NEPA review, one commentator argues that
"[tlhe virtual inevitability of federal involvement, coupled with
NEPA's clear command to include environmental considerations in
the earliest planning of federally supported projects, especially be-
fore alternative sitings and possible palliative actions are fore-
closed," suggests early review.' In the Gottfried case, where an
Army Corps of Engineers' permit must be obtained, a federal suit
to compel a NEPA review might have been timely under federal law
even while Judge Greenfield was rejecting the claim of a state or city
responsibility under state law. The reluctance of the Gottfried court
to read strong environmental requirements into the City compre-
hensive plan illustrates the uncertainty for both conservationist and
developer in dealing with environmental laws. Arguably, until the
forthcoming NEPA review is completed for federal permits, no ex-
tensive or irreversible activity should be encouraged. The court's
reading of the corporation's authorization laws is at odds with an
integrated environmental approach to projects like the Center. As
with the New York Telephone case, where state laws can be
construed to facilitate a socially desirable end, they should be so
construed.
154. 473 F.2d 287 (1st Cir. 1973).
155. Arlington Coalition on Transp. v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323, 1329 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1000 (1972). For a highway ruling in an urban context, see La Raza Unida v. Volpe,
337 F. Supp. 221 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
156. R. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS 69 (1969).
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VI. Conclusion
The deterioration of our cities has engendered among the citizens
a sense that they themselves must act to protect the aesthetics,
health and safety of their habitat. New legislation affords compre-
hensive new rights to citizens when the appropriate administrative
agencies fail to maintain or restore an urban environmental amen-
ity.
The channel into which citizen enforcement action proceeds is the
court system. Traditional administrative law challenges, such as in
Spatt, will doubtless be given a careful and considered reception.
Invocation of the newer environmental criteria may find tougher
sledding. The courts are unfamiliar and unsure of relating these new
rights to older and more traditional standards. The New York
Telephone and Gottfried decisions are illustrative of such judicial
reluctance and uncertainty.
Where specific newer standards may prove difficult for courts to
apply, the more comprehensive instruction of NEPA is more easily
grasped. A court can order a comprehensive analysis of urban envi-
ronmental impact more easily than it can weigh the validity of
ultimate decision. Citizens are in a good position to assail incom-
plete NEPA studies because of their own familiarity with local
urban conditions. NEPA cases also serve to cut through the sectoral ,
isolation of noise, water, air and preservation laws, and to integrate
sympathetically the goals of different environmental statutes.
Environmental law has become an "urban" law field, both in
terms of statutory development and case law. Citizen 'awareness of
the right to enforce environmental law protections has grown' sub-
stantially in recent years. "Citizen groups are not to be treated as
nuisances or trouble makers but rather as welcomed participants in
the vindication of environmental interests."' 5 Through the evolu-
tion of such activism, urban centers in the United States may well
be moving toward establishing the sound environment which has so
often eluded us in the past.
157. Friends of the Earth v. Carey, No. 75-7497, at 3424 (2d Cir. April 26, 1976). In an
appeal arising out of a denial of an action brought by a citizen's group to enforce implementa-
tion of the Transportation Control Plan for the Metropolitan New York City Area (the
"Plan"), the Second Circuit reversed the district court and remanded the case, directing
enforcement of the "Plan's" several strategies to abate air pollution. The court noted the
validity of citizen suits in the environmental area, and said that' the record before them
"crie[dl out for prompt and effective relief if the congressional clean air mandate is to have
any meaning and effect in New York City." Id. at 3440.
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